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Eurozone leaders reached an agreement on Greece on 13 July after lengthy negotiations. Michael Cox
writes that one of the key dynamics during the crisis has been the reluctance of creditors to offer
generous terms to Greece due to their fear that this could provide encouragement for actors in
other Eurozone countries to challenge the established consensus. He argues that the crisis is now
part of a much wider debate about Europe’s political future that goes beyond the limited issue of
Greek debt.
To read the press here in Greece, as well as in that far distant place most Greeks now refer to as
‘Europe’, one could easily conclude that the current crisis is about debt. The Greeks have acquired
lots of it. Their creditors now want their money back. But the Greeks show no sign of being willing or able to pay any
time soon. Hence the impasse in which Greek debtors and European creditors have found themselves.
Of course the crisis is about much more. There are other issues at stake. The problem is that both sides have a
completely different understanding of what the issues actually are. For the Greeks it is self-evident. It is about a
failed austerity programme that was fast destroying their country even before Syriza came into office. As an angry
Greek suggested to me the other night in Athens, the problem right now is not the current government: it’s all those
crooks who went before. Maybe. But stay in Greece for more than a few days and you soon find out it is about much
more besides. First, it is about Greek national pride, and the very strong belief in the country that Greece should not
be pushed around by foreigners. And second, it is about that most Greek of all political ideas: democracy. Which is
one of the reasons why Tsipras called that controversial, but deeply symbolic, referendum last Sunday.
Needless to say, none this is of any interest at all to the
creditor countries. The Greeks might have invented
democracy and had a seriously tough time with some
other countries in the past, but that doesn’t mean they
shouldn’t pay their bills. Or live within their means. Or
claim privileges for themselves which others less
pampered than they – like the Irish and the Portuguese
– have been denied. For all these reasons, and no
doubt many more besides, Syriza is at best not trusted,
and at worst, quite literally hated by many politicians in
Europe. Tsipras may quote Greek philosophers to his
heart’s content, but that doesn’t cut much ice in Berlin,
Brussels or Strasbourg. The left may admire him. Some
may even see him as a kind of swashbuckling Robin
Hood figure leading Europe out of the terrible impasse
in which it now finds itself. But his numerous opponents
from across the continent just can’t abide the man with
his confident demeanour, anti-establishment rhetoric,
and equally casual, anti-establishment dress code. ‘Why
doesn’t he wear a tie for goodness sake?’ a conservative Greek once asked me.
But behind all this there is something far more significant going on, and not just on the floor of the European
Parliament where Tsipras recently spoke in his typically rock star way. Hinted at by some, but without being talked
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about too loudly by most politicians, this particular game is as important as any that has been played in Europe
since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, it bears more than a passing resemblance to an idea that made its debut
during the Cold War itself: and that idea, crudely stated, is that if a single country tries to challenge the established
consensus, it will inevitably have a destabilising demonstration or ‘domino’ effect on several others. So the
contagion must be contained and the country in question be forced to pay a heavy price ‘pour décourager les
autres‘. This will certainly hurt the country in question. Which is unfortunate. But that will at least have the effect of
dissuading anybody else foolhardy enough from tripping lightly down the same irresponsible path.
Viewed in this way the Greek crisis takes on a much wider significance for Europe as whole. And it’s not just about
debt. It is about something else: namely, Europe’s political future. Will this future be shaped by a set of ‘liberal’
economic rules that take it as read that there is bound to be a lot more restructuring pain before there is ever going
to be any real material gain. Or will it, as Syriza’s many enemies out there now fear – and fear with some reason
given the fragile state of Europe – be increasingly shaped by those on the radical left (and even the populist right)
who feel that the liberal economic model is bust and needs to be replaced by something else that will return ‘power
to the people’. This in reality is what is now at stake.
The Greeks today obviously – and understandably – feel that they are occupying centre stage. That the current
struggle is all about them. But in a very important sense Greece has become something of a side-show – albeit a
very important side-show – in a much bigger game where the stakes could not be higher. We live, as the Chinese
are always quoted as saying – probably unfairly – in ‘interesting times’.
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